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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-3278 
_____________ 
 
VALENTIN CEDENO, 
 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District of New Jersey 
(No. 3:09-cv-06395) 
District Judge: Honorable Garrett E. Brown, Jr. 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 18, 2011 
____________ 
 
Before:  FUENTES and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges and POGUE, Judge.1
 Valentin Cedeno appeals the District Court’s denial of his motion to vacate his 
conviction of conspiracy to commit robbery.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
 
 
(Filed:  December 15, 2011) 
____________ 
 
OPINION  
____________ 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
                                              
1 Honorable Donald C. Pogue, Chief Judge, United States Court of International Trade, 
sitting by designation. 
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I. 
 We write solely for the parties’ benefit and recite only the facts essential to our 
disposition. 
In April 2005, Cedeno and several co-conspirators robbed a jewelry store in Boca 
Raton, Florida.  Cedeno was apprehended and charged with conspiracy to commit 
robbery and robbery in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951 and 2.  On August 
12, 2005, he pleaded guilty to both charges in the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Florida.  The District Court subsequently sentenced him to a 65-
month term of incarceration.  After prevailing on direct appeal in the Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit, Cedeno was resentenced to 51 months in prison. 
Meanwhile, investigators in New Jersey identified Cedeno as part of a Newark-
based group that committed “smash-and-grab” robberies of retail jewelry stores up and 
down the East Coast.  In July 2008, a federal grand jury sitting in the District of New 
Jersey returned a superseding indictment that charged members of the group with 
conspiracy to commit robbery from July 2003 to September 2005 in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1951(a); robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951 and 2; and receipt of stolen 
goods in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2315 and 2.  The indictment alleged that Cedeno 
participated in the conspiracy (count 1); committed robberies in Sanford, Florida in 
January 2004 and Buford, Georgia in March 2004 (counts 7 and 8); and received stolen 
goods (count 9).  Named as a co-conspirator in the New Jersey indictment, among others, 
was Angel Concepcion, an individual also named as a co-conspirator in the Florida 
indictment.  
3 
 
 The Hobbs Act conspiracy and robbery charges each carried a statutory maximum 
of 20 years in prison, while the receipt of stolen goods charge carried a statutory 
maximum of 10 years in prison.  Cedeno’s counsel and the Government entered into plea 
negotiations and eventually arrived at an agreement under which Cedeno would plead 
guilty to the conspiracy charge in exchange for dismissal of the remaining charges.  The 
parties also agreed to argue for a sentence within the range recommended for offense 
level 24 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines.  Included in the plea agreement was 
the following waiver of certain appellate rights:  “Cedeno . . . voluntarily waives[] the 
right to file any appeal, any collateral attack, or any other writ or motion . . . which 
challenges the sentence imposed by the sentencing court if that sentence falls within or 
below the Guidelines . . . offense level of 24.”  In accordance with the plea agreement, 
Cedeno pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey 
to conspiring to commit robbery and the court sentenced him to a 57-month term of 
incarceration, within the parties’ agreed-upon range.  Cedeno did not appeal the sentence. 
In December 2009, Cedeno sought collateral relief in the District Court pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  He contended that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to 
the effective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to challenge the New Jersey 
indictment on double jeopardy grounds and advised him to plead guilty to a conspiracy 
charge possibly barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  
Cedeno’s theory was that the conspiracy alleged in the New Jersey indictment was the 
same conspiracy for which he already stood convicted by his guilty plea in the Southern 
District of Florida.   
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The District Court denied the petition.  It reasoned that Cedeno knowingly and 
voluntarily entered into the plea agreement and that the waiver clause foreclosed review 
of his conviction.  Holding Cedeno to his waiver, the court concluded, would not result in 
a miscarriage of justice because the Southern District of Florida and the New Jersey 
indictments alleged two different conspiracies to commit robbery.2
                                              
2 To determine whether the two conspiracies were in fact the same offense for double 
jeopardy purposes, the District Court applied the totality of the circumstances test set 
forth in United States v. Liotard, 817 F.2d 1074, 1078 (3d Cir. 1987).  It considered 
whether the two conspiracies shared overlapping locations, dates of commission, 
personnel, and overt acts.  Appendix 8-11 (citing Liotard, 817 F.2d at 1078).  Concluding 
that three of the four factors indicated that Cedeno was charged with participating in two 
distinct conspiracies, the District Court found that the second conspiracy charge did not 
raise double jeopardy concerns. 
  Absent a colorable 
claim that the Double Jeopardy Clause would preclude prosecution under the second 
indictment, the District Court held, Cedeno’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim was 
without merit.  The court did not hear argument or hold an evidentiary hearing. 
Cedeno filed a timely appeal.  We remanded to the District Court to determine 
whether a certificate of appealability should issue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253.  
Concluding that Cedeno had failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a 
constitutional right, the District Court declined to issue the certificate of appealability.  
Cedeno thereafter sought a certificate of appealability from this Court.  We appointed 
appellate counsel and granted a certificate of appealability on the following questions:  
1) whether Cedeno’s counsel was constitutionally ineffective in advising him to 
plead guilty to a charge that may have implicated double jeopardy concerns, and 
whether any such ineffectiveness rendered the plea agreement, including its 
waiver provision, invalid; and 2) if the plea was valid, whether there was a double 
jeopardy violation and, if so, whether enforcing the waiver provision would result 
in a ‘miscarriage of justice’ . . . .   
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II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over Cedeno’s § 2255 petition pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1331.  It issued final judgment on July 2, 2010.  We granted a certificate of 
appealability on January 13, 2011, and have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1291, 2253 and 2255(d).  “In a federal habeas corpus proceeding, we exercise 
plenary review of the district court’s legal conclusions and apply a clearly erroneous 
standard to the court’s factual findings.”  United States v. Lilly, 536 F.3d 190, 195 (3d 
Cir. 2008). 
III. 
 In its memorandum urging the District Court to deny Cedeno’s § 2255 petition, the 
Government argued that Cedeno waived his right to seek collateral review.  The District 
Court agreed and construed the waiver provision in Cedeno’s plea agreement to preclude 
his § 2255 motion.  On appeal, the Government candidly concedes that its construction of 
the waiver provision, accepted by the District Court, was mistaken.  By the plain terms of 
the agreement, Cedeno waived certain rights to seek collateral review of the sentence 
imposed by the sentencing court, but he did not waive the right to challenge the legal 
basis of the conviction itself.  Cf. United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 562 (3d Cir. 
2001) (“[W]aivers of appeals should be strictly construed.”).  
 The Government also concedes that, had Cedeno timely raised a double jeopardy 
defense, he would have been entitled to a hearing on whether the two conspiracies 
charged were in fact the same offense.  United States v. Inmon, 594 F.2d 352, 353 (3d 
Cir. 1979) (per curiam).  In the hearing, the Government would have borne the burden of 
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establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not 
require dismissal of the second conspiracy charge.  United States v. Inmon, 568 F.2d 326, 
331-32 (3d Cir. 1977).  In light of this concession, the parties now agree that the District 
Court was mistaken in concluding that Cedeno lacked a colorable double jeopardy claim 
prior to his second guilty plea. 
The upshot of the Government’s position is that we must consider Cedeno’s § 
2255 petition on the merits.  Accordingly, we turn to the question whether defense 
counsel’s advice to Cedeno to plead guilty to a conspiracy charge possibly barred by the 
Double Jeopardy Clause constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. 
IV. 
 The Supreme Court announced the standard for judging ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  To prevail, a 
defendant must show (1) that his counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard 
of reasonableness” and (2) that his counsel’s deficiencies caused prejudice such that 
“there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result 
of the proceeding would have been different.”  Id. at 688, 694.  A slightly modified 
version of Strickland’s two-part test applies to ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
arising out of the plea process.  Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985); United States v. 
Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 638 (3d Cir. 2011).  To establish prejudice, “the defendant must 
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not 
have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”  Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 59.  
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 The Government argues that notwithstanding the District Court’s erroneous 
reasoning, we should affirm the denial of the motion to vacate because Cedeno cannot 
demonstrate that his counsel’s performance was deficient or caused him to suffer 
prejudice.  Even if Cedeno had a colorable double jeopardy defense, the Government 
maintains, defense counsel was not constitutionally deficient because he secured Cedeno 
a favorable plea deal.  Nor, in the Government’s view, can Cedeno establish prejudice 
because even if he prevailed on a double jeopardy challenge to the conspiracy charge, he 
was nonetheless subject to the two Hobbs Act robbery charges and the receipt of stolen 
goods charge.  
 “Our Court ‘has endorsed the practical suggestion in Strickland [that we may] 
consider the prejudice prong before examining the performance of counsel prong because 
this course of action is less burdensome to defense counsel.’”  Lilly, 536 F.3d at 196  
(quoting United States v. Booth, 432 F.3d 542, 546 (3d Cir. 2005) (quotation marks 
omitted)); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (“If it is easier to dispose of an 
ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will 
often be so, that course should be followed.”).  We opt to follow that approach here. 
  Had defense counsel secured dismissal of the conspiracy charge, the Hobbs Act 
charges arising out of the Sanford, Florida and Buford, Georgia robberies and the receipt 
of stolen goods charge would have remained.  See United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378, 
389 (1992) (“[A] substantive crime and a conspiracy to commit that crime are not the 
‘same offence’ for double jeopardy purposes.”).  If Cedeno had gone to trial and been 
convicted of those charges, his maximum statutory sentencing exposure was 50 years in 
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prison.  Following Cedeno’s guilty plea, however, the District Court imposed a 57-month 
term of incarceration, a favorable sentence given the gravity of the charges. 
Cedeno does not deny his involvement in the robberies or his receipt of stolen 
goods.  The failure to disavow those charges supports the Government’s contention that 
he would have been convicted had the case gone to trial.  See Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 
—, 131 S. Ct. 733, 745 (2011) (suggesting that a defendant’s failure to deny involvement 
in the underlying crime counsels against a finding of prejudice).  Nor does he contest the 
strength of the Government’s evidence on the three remaining charges or represent that 
he would have opted to go to trial on those charges had the District Court dismissed the 
conspiracy charge.3
Cedeno has not established a reasonable probability that, had he known that the 
conspiracy charge was susceptible to a double jeopardy challenge, he would not have 
pleaded guilty to one of the three remaining charges and would have insisted on going to 
trial.  See Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 59.  Consequently, the errors made by defense counsel, if 
any, were not prejudicial.  Absent a showing that defense counsel’s advice prejudiced the 
outcome of the case, Cedeno’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim must fail.
    
4
                                              
3 Cedeno’s brief asserts that “had he been advised on the significant meritorious defense 
of double jeopardy . . . he would have insisted that counsel zealously challenge the New 
Jersey indictment, and certainly would not have pled guilty to Count One of the New 
Jersey Indictment.”  Cedeno Br. 11.  Nowhere does he insist that he would not have 
pleaded guilty to any of the three remaining charges. 
 
4 We have not considered whether defense counsel renders deficient performance by 
advising a defendant to plead guilty to a charge possibly barred by the Double Jeopardy 
Clause in order to secure a favorable plea agreement.  In view of Cedeno’s inability to 
establish prejudice, we reserve the question for another day. 
  We 
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therefore will affirm the District Court’s denial of the § 2255 motion on the alternative 
basis that Cedeno was not deprived of his right to the effective assistance of counsel.  See 
United States v. Sanchez, 562 F.3d 275, 279 (3d Cir. 2009) (“An appellate court may 
affirm a result reached by the District Court on different reasons, as long as the record 
supports the judgment.”).5
                                                                                                                                                  
 
5 Because Cedeno cannot prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we need 
not consider his cursory request for an evidentiary hearing “to explore trial counsel’s 
‘strategy’ in not raising” the double jeopardy defense.  Cedeno Br. 11.  An ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim that clearly fails to establish prejudice does not merit an 
evidentiary hearing.  See Lilly, 536 F.3d at 197 (“Because [the defendant] has failed to 
establish that [defense counsel’s] advice prejudiced him in any way . . . , we conclude 
that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to hold an evidentiary 
hearing before denying his claim.”). 
  In light of this conclusion, we need not address the remaining 
questions certified in the certificate of appealability. 
V. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
